This paper estimates how the incumbency status of a candidate affects his or her chances of winning, known as the incumbency effects, using a large dataset on legislative elections of 25 states in India between 1975 and 2003. I use an innovative research design that disentangles the effect due to candidate quality from that due to incumbency by comparing the candidates in closely fought elections. This is a major improvement over previous methods and provides unbiased estimates of the incumbency effects. I find that incumbency has a significant negative effect on the fortunes of incumbent candidates. The probability of an incumbent winning the next election is 18 percentage points lower during 1975-91 and 25 percentage points lower during 1991-2003 than that of a nonincumbent. The variation in the incumbency effects across Indian states depends on the differences in degree of competitiveness of elections and, to a lesser extent, on the public provision of educational facilities by the government. *
Introduction
On average, incumbent candidates in the United States win more votes and are more likely to win than non-incumbent candidates. There is evidence that the incumbency advantage is greater after the mid-1960s (Cover 1977; Erikson 1971 Erikson , 1972 ; Gelman and King 1990; Levitt and Wolfram 1997) . However, the evidence from outside the United States does not support an intrinsic advantage to incumbency. For example, Gaines (1998) Moreover, a finding that the incumbency effects are negative there provides a dramatic contrast to what we find in the United States.
A major methodological contribution of this paper is its application of the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to estimation of the incumbency effects in Indian state elections. This methodology allows us to approximate a natural experiment, and gives us an unbiased estimate of the incumbency effects. RDD considers closely fought contests, and premises that candidates in such contests (bare winners and bare losers) are ex ante comparable, on average, in all candidate-specific characteristics such as experience and constituency-specific (district-specific) factors such as partisan effects, number of candidates contesting the election and so on. The only difference between candidates in such contests is in their incumbency status. The winning candidates become incumbents and the losing candidates will be non-incumbents. Moreover, the outcome of such contests is highly unpredictable, which coupled with the comparability of candidates, brings about a random assignment of the incumbency status. So, any difference in their outcome in the next election will identify what is essentially an unbiased estimate of the true incumbency effect. The validity of the assumption about comparability of bare winners and bare losers can be readily checked with the data, as is shown below.
RDD is a new methodology, which has only recently been applied to empirical election studies. Lee (2005) uses the RDD to estimate partisan incumbency effects in the United States House of Representatives and finds that incumbent party is 40-45 percentage points more likely than non-incumbent party to win the next election. In terms of the vote shares, the effect is to raise the vote share of incumbent party by 8 percentage points as compared to non-incumbent party.
In contrast to the literature in the United States, which defines incumbency ad- The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly lays out the empirical methodology. Various methodological complexities are discussed in the third section. The fourth section talks about the empirical results of the paper and provides the robustness checks. The fifth section compares the RDD estimates with those based on other commonly used methods.
The sixth section seeks an explanation for variation in incumbency disadvantage across Indian states. The final section concludes and offers a brief discussion of the significance of the findings of this paper.
Methodology
Scholarly work by various political scientists in the 1970s started the debate on incumbency effects in the United States. 4 Two measures of incumbency ad- 4 There was a general agreement that the incumbency advantage increased significantly after the mid-1960s. The debate focused more on the factors causing an increase in the incumbency advantage. Among various factors given for increased incumbent security are incumbents' control over redistricting plans (Tufte 1973) , increased franking privileges (Mayhew 1974) , increased identification with the candidate rather than the party (Erikson 1971 (Erikson , 1972 Cover 1977; Ferejohn 1977 ) and increased bureaucratic resources available to incumbents (Fiorina 1977) . Jacobson (1985 Jacobson ( , 1987 , however, argued that the incumbency advantage did not increase after the mid-1960s as the reelection chances of incumbents had not increased.
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vantage, namely the sophomore surge and the retirement slump, were widely used in the literature. The sophomore surge is the average vote gain enjoyed by freshman candidates running as incumbents for the first time and the retirement slump is the average falloff in the party's vote when the incumbent retires (Cover and Mayhew 1977) . Gelman and King (1990) reignited the debate by showing that both these measures were biased. They show that the sophomore surge underestimates and the retirement slump overestimates the effect due to incumbency. They use a regression-based approach in which they control for the national partisan swings that were missing from previous measures.
The main limitation of Gelman and King's approach, acknowledged by them, is that their measure does not account for candidate quality. Levitt and Wolfram (1997) point out in relation to the elections in the United States that first, an incumbent is likely to be of higher quality, on average, compared to an open seat candidate, and second, seats contested by incumbents will attract weaker challengers as compared to the open seats. A failure to control for candidate quality, hence, will overestimate the incumbency effect.
The ideal natural experiment to estimate the incumbency effects would require us to observe a candidate as an incumbent and a non-incumbent at the same point of time and, hence, is not possible. The next best research design would be to have candidates randomly assigned as incumbents and nonincumbents. This seems hard to accomplish in practice due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity among the candidates that will bias the estimates of incumbency effects. For example, candidates who received some favorable shocks, say, in election t would become incumbents in election t + 1. In particular, the candidates who win at t may be better qualified for office than the losers. As a result, their reelection in t + 1 may be due to their being better candidates rather than any inherent incumbency advantage.
The Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is a simple methodology that 6 aims to approximate a random assignment of the incumbency status from the real world of nonrandom data. Thistlethwaite and Cambell (1960) The main identification strategy is that incumbency status changes discontinuously at the threshold of margin of victory (mov) of zero, whereas all other (observable and unobservable) characteristics vary continuously as a function of margin of victory. The candidates for whom mov is positive will become incumbents, and for whom it is negative will be non-incumbents. If incumbency has any effect, the next period election outcome (such as probability of winning in t + 1 and vote share in t + 1) as a function of margin of victory in t will be discontinuous at the threshold, and the size of the discontinuity will give us an unbiased estimate of the incumbency effect. This can be illustrated with an 7 application of the RDD to estimation of the incumbency effects. Let us consider a naive model specification with no control variables. I consider a simple linear probability model due to the ease of exposition.
where win i,t+1 is an indicator variable which is one if candidate i wins in election t+1 and zero otherwise. I i,t+1 is an indicator variable for the incumbency status of a candidate such that
where mov i,t is the margin of victory for candidate i in election t. In multicandidate races, as found in India, the margin of victory of a candidate who wins the election in t is the difference between his or her vote share and the vote share of the second-place candidate in t. Similarly, the margin of victory of a losing candidate in t is the difference between his or her vote share and the vote share of the winner in t. This construct allows the margin of victory to be positive for the winning candidates, and negative for the losing candidates. ε j,t+1 is the stochastic error term that represents all other observable and unobservable characteristics of the candidate. The incumbency effect from this specification can be given by
where β is the true incumbency effect and
Note that the bias arises because the winning and losing candidates differ in their observable and unobservable characteristics.
RDD compares the bare winners and the bare losers such that
where BIAS * i,t+1 = E{ε i,t+1 | 0 ≤ mov i,t ≤ ψ} − E{ε i,t+1 | −ψ ≤ mov i,t ≤ 0} and ψ represents the closeness of the elections. BIAS * i,t+1 goes to zero as ψ gets smaller and smaller or as we examine closer and closer elections. Given that we 8 consider closer and closer elections, β will give us the true incumbency effect.
This paper estimates the left hand side in (5), which is the difference between probability of winning in t+1 of the bare winners and bare losers in t conditional on the candidate and the constituency characteristics. The only assumption made is that the conditional density function of ε, g(ε | mov), is continuously distributed. 5 This assumption implies that all other characteristics vary continuously as a function of margin of victory.
Data Description
The source of election data is the Statistical Reports on General Election to This amounted to a datset of 220,726 candidate-level observations. The unit of observation is a candidate in an election.
The data set provides information on the names of candidates contesting the election and their respective vote shares, sex and party affiliation. There is also information on the number of registered voters, the number of registered voters who turned out to vote, the rate of voter turnout, and the number of constituencies reserved for the scheduled casts (SC) and the scheduled tribes (ST)
candidates. 9 A major problem with the data is that the ECI does not record the names of candidates consistently. First, a candidate might be reported as last name followed by his or her first name or vice versa. The order of first and last names is switched in a subsequent election. Second, the middle names are omitted in some elections and included in some other. Third, full names and initialled names used interchangeably over different elections. Lastly, the spellings of the names are incorrectly reported in some elections. This made it extremely difficult to track the candidates over time given the size of the dataset.
I overcome this problem in two ways. First, I drop the observations that have a vote share of less than 5% in any election. In Indian elections, the number of candidates in any election tends to be large, and many candidates perform poorly and are not expected to have any effect on the eventual outcome. 
Estimation of Incumbency Effects
The incumbents in India fare worse than their counterparts in the United
States. The average vote share and the average margin of victory of a winner are about 48% and 15%, respectively, in India. The same for the United States are 60% to 70% and 20% to 30% (Lee n.d.). The simple probability of a winner in t (incumbent) becoming a candidate in the election at t + 1 (proportion of incumbents running for reelection in the next election) is 0.55 in India (0.88 in the United States). The probability of an incumbent winning the next election conditional on rerunning is 0.5 (0.9 in the United States). The probability that a loser in t becomes a candidate in election at t + 1 is 0.21 (0.2 in the United States). The probability of a loser in t winning the election at t + 1 conditional on rerunning is 0.38 (0.15 in the United States). (1985, 1987) stressed that it is the probability of winning, which is of primary importance, rather than the vote share.
11 hFigure 4 about herei As emphasized earlier, an important requirement for the RDD estimates of incumbency effects to be valid is that the factors at t other than the incum- 11 Jacobson contended the finding by other researchers that incumbency advantage increased in the United States after the mid-1960s. He agreed that House incumbents, on average, won higher vote share in the 1960s as compared to the 1950s. But the probability of losing for the incumbents had not declined rendering incumbents as likely to lose in the 1960s as earlier.
bency status of the candidates be a continuous function of the margin of victory around the threshold. A convincing test of this assumption on the basis of all possible characteristics is constrained by lack of comprehensive data. Lee (2003) uses electoral and official experience as the two measures of the candidate characteristics. I check for continuity of various candidate characteristics such as the vote share in t-1, the electoral experience of a candidate at t (number of times a candidate has contested the election up to t), the political experience at t (number of times a candidate has won an election up to t), the proportion of female candidates, the proportion of candidates belonging to Indian National Congress (INC) (proportion of INC candidates), and the proportion of candidates belonging to Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) (proportion of BJP candidates). The INC and the BJP are the two largest parties in India. I also check for the following constituency characteristics such as the number of registered voters, the number of registered voters who turned out to vote (# who turned out to vote), the rate of voter turnout, the number of candidates, the proportion of seats reserved for the SC candidates (proportion of scheduled casts) and the proportion of seats reserved for the ST candidates (proportion of scheduled tribes). Table 2a provides the continuity checks for the pre-1991 period. 12 Columns (2)- (10) show the probability of winning and the vote share in t + 1 and other characteristics for winners, losers and their differences for all winners and losers (All), when |m arg in of victory| ≤ 25% and when |m arg in of victory| ≤ 5%. In columns (2)- (4), winners, on average, have a greater vote share in the previous election, have more electoral and political experience, greater proportion of females, slightly less likely to belong to BJP, feature in constituencies with higher voter turnout, have fewer candidates standing for election and are less likely to belong to a constituency reserved for scheduled tribe as compared to the losers.
The differences become smaller and smaller as the margin of victory gets closer to zero. In column (10), when |m arg in of victory| ≤ 5%, all the differences in predetermined candidate and constituency characteristics become statistically insignificant implying continuity of the characteristics as a function of margin of victory, whereas differences in the probability of winning and the vote shares in t + 1 remain significant.
hTable 2a about herei
Columns (11)- (12) The incumbents who survive multiple terms and retire are likely to be of higher quality. As a result, the RS estimates are biased as the quality of the candidates is not taken into account. Another limitation of the SS and the RS estimates is that they may contradict each other, as is the case here. 
Explaining Incumbency Disadvantage across Indian States
The task of carrying out a comparative analysis for the United States and India is beyond the scope of this paper. But it is interesting to look for explanations of contrasting incumbency effects in terms of the differences between the two countries. First, both countries differ in the kind of party systems they have. India is a multi-party system causing the contests to be relatively more competitive (as already pointed out above in terms of lower vote share and margin of victory for the winners). It is quite plausible that in the states, where elections are more competitive, incumbents might find it harder to hold on to their seats. Second, India is a developing country, where people do not have access to even basic necessities of life. The picture is really grim as far as the provision of public goods is concerned. In 1991, only 42.4% of Indian population had access to electricity, 62.3% had safe drinking water, and only 30.4% had both. About 27% villages did not have a primary school and 67% did not have any health infrastructure (Banerjee and Somanathan 2001). 15 Since voters care about the provision of public goods, the states with greater supply of public goods should have higher incumbency effect.
I use the difference between the vote shares of the first-place party and the 15 They provide survey evidence that voters care about the provision of public goods by the government. According to survey results provided by the National Election Study (a post election survey of voters after the Parliamentary elections in India in 1996), four out of ten major problems facing the country are related to physical and social infrastructure such as drinking water, education, health, transport, communication and electricity. These problems would be even more prominent at the state-level elections, where issues tend to be localized and the international issues such the Foreign Policy are not very important.
second-place party as a measure of political competition in a state. The higher this difference, the less competitive are the elections in that state and the higher is the incumbency effect (or the lower is the incumbency disadvantage). There is also considerable variation in literacy rate, percentage of population that is literate, across Indian states. In 1991, only 37.5% of the population in Bihar was literate, as compared to 89.8% in Kerala. I proxy the literacy rate in a state for the provision of primary educational facilities by the government. The more literate a state is, the higher is the incumbency effect. I use electricity, percentage of households with electricity as the source of lighting, as another measure of public good provision. The rate of voter turnout is used to represent voter activism 16 . I also control for per capita income of states, their population and the percent of population that is urbanized (percent urban). (2), the probability difference is regressed on literacy and electricity using simple least squares estimation. The coefficient on literacy is positive and significant implying that more literate states have higher incumbency effects (or lower incumbency disadvantage). The coefficient on electricity is negative, but insignificant. 18 In column (3), I include political 16 But the effect of voter turnout is ambiguous. For example, if voters are dissatisfied with the state of affairs, higher voter turnout may work against the incumbent implying a negative relationship. If they rate government's performance as good, the effect might be positive. 17 18 The negative coefficient on electricity can be explained on the basis of the poor quality of electricity supply in most parts of India. The electricity supply is mostly erratic and can be off for days even in the big metropolitan cities such as New Delhi. This might cause more 
Conclusions
In the United States, the incumbent candidates have an advantage, as comdissatisfaction if you have electricity than if you do not.
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pared to the non-incumbent candidates, due to incumbency. But researchers have struggled to isolate the effect due to incumbency status of a candidate from overall advantage due to candidate-specific and district-specific characteristics. The particular research design allowed by RDD is able to isolate the effect due to incumbency. The comparability of bare winners and bare losers approximates a random assignment of incumbency status. In such a situation, size of the discontinuity in probability of winning at margin of victory of zero gives us an unbiased estimate of incumbency effects. This paper provides evidence of a significant incumbency disadvantage in Indian state elections. This contrasts dramatically with the incumbency effect found in the United States, where the effect of incumbency is positive for the incumbents.
The validity of my RDD estimates is established by comparing bare losers with bare winners at election t. It turns out that all the differences in the candidate and the constituency characteristics between them become insignificant, as we compare closer and closer elections, and thus, any difference in their t + 1 election outcome is because of the their incumbency status. I check for the robustness of my estimates by considering different specifications of probability of winning in t + 1. The estimate passes all robustness checks. Finally, the comparability of the losing candidates, who rerun and those who do not rerun around the threshold, allows me to believe that incumbency effect after conditioning on the candidates who rerun does provide us estimates that are free from the bias due to differences between rerunning and non-rerunning candidates.
The results in the previous section suggest that political competition works to undermine the authority of incumbents. The elections at the state level Notes: Dependent Variable is the difference in probability of winning between bare winners and bare losers. The unit of observation is a state. Literacy is percent of literates in a state. Electricity is percent of households having source of lighting as electricity. Political Competition is the difference between the vote shares of first-place and second-place parties. Percent Urban is the state-wise percentage of urban population. The parentheses show the t-ratios of the coefficients. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Probability of Winning
Difference=
FIGURE 1. Probability of Winning in t+1
Notes: The local averages are proportion of winners in an interval of margin of victory of 0.5%. The parametric fit is the predicted probabilities from a logistic regression of an indicator variable for a win in t+1 on a dummy variable indicating incumbency status of the candidate at t+1, a fourth order polynomial of margin of victory, their interactions with incumbency dummy and state and year fixed effects. The values are predicted separately for the winners and the losers to find the size of discontinuity at the threshold. The entire sample, assuming the candidates who do not rerun lose, is considered. 
FIGURE 2. Probability of Rerunning in t+1
Notes: The local averages are the proportion of rerunners in an interval of margin of victory of 0.5%. The parametric fit is the predicted probabilities from a logistic regression of an indicator variable for rerunning in t+1 on a dummy variable indicating incumbency status of the candidate at t+1, a fourth order polynomial of margin of victory, their interactions with incumbency dummy and state and year fixed effects. The values are predicted separately for the winners and the losers to find the size of discontinuity at the threshold. 
